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This paper explores the appointment of career diplomats and political appointments to ambassado-
rial positions, across a range of characteristics that serve to indicate the attractiveness of the posting.
The results of the paper suggest that political appointees are more likely to become ambassadors in
high income OECD countries, that are strong tourist destinations, are located in Western Europe, and
that carry lower hardship allowances, than are career diplomats. We also show that the greater the
personal or bundled campaign contributions to a presidential campaign, the more lucrative the posting
the contributor can expect in terms of per capita GDP, tourist volumes, hardship allowances, and the
more likely the posting will be in Western Europe, and the less likely it will be in Central and South
Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, we identify a range of prices for personal and bundled campaign
contributors for a set of lucrative posts. Depending on circumstance, we establish that the price range
for the Court of St. James lies between $650,000 and $2.3 million.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since it ﬁrst began bestowing the title of ambassador on its diplomatic envoys in 1893, the United States
has often made such appointments openly and explicitly on the basis of political and/or personal connection
with the president. Historically, diplomatic appointments have frequently been related to the magnitude of
ﬁnancial contributions made to presidential campaigns. This practice persists today, and according to some
observers may grow because of the increasing costs of mounting a presidential campaign.1
Standard models of rational institutional design posit that appointments to public administrative oﬃce
should be on the basis of merit on a competence metric related to the deliverables associated with the post.
So much so that deviations from this model, for instance to award positions on the basis of pure political or
personal connection, might be taken as evidence of cronyism. Where appointments are awarded on the basis
of ﬁnancial contributions to the chief executive who awards the post, charges of corruption become feasible.
Klitgaard (1988), for instance presents a principal-agent account of corruption, in which corruption is deﬁned
by the pursuit by the agent of private objectives (say, maximizing campaign contributions), at the expense
of the principal’s objectives (say, the American electorate’s wish to have the best possible international
representation of American interests). In this sense, the United States’ practice of political appointees to
senior diplomatic posts, does carry a whiﬀ of corruption.2 This has long been the practice despite the fact
that the Foreign Service Act of 1980 prohibits any linkage between political campaign contributions and
appointments of individuals to chief of mission status.
Formally, the practice of political appointments (unless they were explicitly linked to campaign contri-
butions, which would contravene the Foreign Service Act of 1980) to diplomatic posts is not illegal. It is
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1See for example Al Kamen’s commentary to this eﬀect in the Washington Post of May 26, 2011, under the heading
"Embassies for Sale"
2Klitgaard’s principal-agent model of corruption could readily account for the United States practice. Since expunging
corruption is costly, and corruption may even carry some beneﬁts for society, the optimal level of corruption for society cannot
be zero. Political ambassadorial appointments would be costly to eliminate, and the beneﬁt so fd o i n gs om a yn o tb es u ﬃcient
to merit the political capital that would be required to eﬀect the change in the tradition.
1a long-established tradition. And it is subject to public scrutiny. In a narrow technical sense, therefore, it
escapes the opprobrium that we associate with corruption.
B u ti ti so d d .
Not only is there no obvious reason why political appointees should be best suited to delicate diplomatic
manoeuvring between powers. On the contrary, one could readily imagine that partisan domestic political
politics might select for traits that are inimical for the nuanced pursuit of long-term national interest on the
global stage. Certainly no other major democratic power currently pursues a human resource appointments
strategy for ambassadorial positions based so signiﬁcantly on political connection.
The present paper examines the characteristics of the United States’ practice of making political ambas-
sadorial appointments more closely. In doing so, it confronts three tasks.
We begin with a condensed background statement, that characterizes in very broad terms the evolution
of the United States’ diplomatic service since the end of the eighteenth century. Second, it characterizes the
distribution of political, as well as career diplomats across diﬀerent types of postings. The central issue being
addressed in the process is whether there are any systematic patterns in the sorts of diplomatic postings
that political appointees obtain. Third, we assess what inﬂuence three distinct types of political capital
(personal or direct connection to the President, magnitude of personal Presidential campaign contributions,
magnitude of total collected Presidential campaign contributions) have on the sort of diplomatic postings
that political appointees obtain.
The central hypothesis that guides our examination of the data, is that political appointees demand a
r e t u r no nt h e i ri n v e s t m e n ti np o l i t i c a lc a p i t a lw i t ha n yg i v e nU n i t e dS t a t e sa d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,a n dd os oi nt h e
form of "attractive" postings. On the other hand, the US State Department wishes to limit the possible
damage that political appointees with their relative diplomatic inexperience, can wreak on international
United States interests. Such appointments coincide with desirable postings in high-income countries in
Western Europe, or countries in the Caribbean. Finally, the president stands to gain campaign contributions,
and in the case of particularly trusted political appointments, an additional opportunity of oversight over
the activity of the State Department from a trusted political associate.
Thus the appointing president gains campaign contributions, and those providing the contributions receive
ap a y - o ﬀ in the form of desirable diplomatic postings. The State Department monitors politically appointed
ambassadors through the professional diplomatic service. Moreover, to the extent that there is goal alignment
between the president and the ambassador, the political administration obtains a monitoring service over
the State Department, through the political appointee to an ambassadorship. Since the State Department
has evolved reliable means to limit the strategic capacities of politically appointed ambassadors, and the
presidency stands to gain both campaign contributions and the possibility of improved monitoring of the
State Department from political appointees to diplomatic posts, it is possible to understand why the practice
persists, despite the fact that it stands in tension with the requirements of the Foreign Service Act.3
In our empirical work we establish a clear association between political campaign contributions and the
desirability of the posting that the political appointee realizes. The analysis allows us to infer the underlying
implicit price list imposed by the Obama administration for the set of postings that appear desirable to
political appointees.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the historical background to the study. In section
3 we outline the hypotheses that guide the empirical modelling strategy of the paper. Section 4 reports our
data sources, and section 5 describes the estimation methodology we employ. Results are reported in section
6, while section 7 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
Diplomatic envoys were sent abroad to represent the United States from the ﬁrst days of the republic. Over
a century passed until any of the envoys of the young republic bore the title ambassador, however.4 The
founding fathers thought that such a rank was borne only by the representatives of kings. The new country
3We limit ourselves to pointing to a tension. Given our data constraints, we are not able to establish that campaign
contributions lead to diplomatic appointments. However, we are able to report associations between the level of campaign
contributions, and the extent to which a posting is desirable on a range of characteristics.
4See Herring (2008: 300).
2was too egalitarian for one of its citizens to be elevated to a position with a title that implied a higher status
than that of his fellow citizens.5
When the United States entered its second century, its westward expansion on the continent had run its
course and it turned its attention to developing foreign markets and other commercial opportunities abroad.
As America’s international economic and political interests grew, so did the number of diplomats thought
necessary to protect them.
In 1893, European countries began elevating their representatives to the United States to the rank of
ambassador in recognition of the growing role of the United States as a power in the world. Congress
decided it had to reciprocate and ﬁnally conceded there was a need for American diplomats to have the title
of ambassador as well.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
The growth in America’s interests and representation abroad is indicated in Figure 1.
For the ﬁrst 150 years, the ﬁrst trend is a slow, but steady, increase in the number of diplomatic posts,
which were headed typically by a chief of mission with the title of minister or, after 1893, possibly by someone
with the title of ambassador. The chief function of diplomatic posts, which were usually embassies, was the
conduct of traditional diplomacy and the political work involved in the relationship between the United
States and the country with whom diplomatic relations were being maintained.
Consular posts, on the other hand, were headed by a consul or consul general and had somewhat diﬀerent
functions. They dealt with commercial and consular matters such as trade issues and the protection of
American businessmen, sailors and other citizens. In the country’s ﬁrst century, consuls were typically
political appointees with little experience in government. They were expected to be largely self-supporting
and sustained themselves by the fees they charged for their services.
The second trend reﬂects the fact that commercial interests grew more quickly than traditional diplomatic
ones. As a result the number of consular posts grew rapidly until they peaked around 1920. It was possible
to have a number of consular posts in the same country and the only real limit on the number of posts
was the extent to which a post could do enough business to be self-sustaining. The number of embassies,
on the other hand, was limited to the number of countries with whom American diplomatic relations were
suﬃciently active to warrant a resident diplomatic representative.
In the ﬁrst two decades of the 20th century, a third trend emerges as the number of consular posts peaks,
and then begins a precipitous decline from the 1920s. This is due to the professionalization of the diplomatic
and consular corps along with the civil service in Washington. It became apparent that the business of
government at home and abroad was becoming too important and complex to leave to inexperienced political
appointees who changed from one administration to the next. Career oﬃcials who were hired and promoted
on the basis of merit began to take over diplomatic and consular duties. This professionalization of the
Foreign Service, which had been underway as a matter of policy, became a matter of law with the passage
of the Rogers Act of 1924.
In the mid-20th century, a ﬁnal trend becomes evident. The growing number of nations in the world,
especially as decolonization begins to gather pace, requires that consulates in the former colonies be replaced
by embassies. In the aftermath of World War II the emergence of the United States as the most powerful
nation in the world, and the onset of the Cold War, required diplomatic representation in nearly every country
in order to protect American interests and to pursue the global struggle against communism. Ambassadorial
ranks were further expanded by a decision to raise every chief of mission to the rank of ambassador. At
the same time, the number of consular posts continued to decline as commercial and consular duties were
increasingly centralized in embassies.
The changing proﬁle of American diplomatic representation reﬂects the changing role and interests of
the United States in the world. For the ﬁrst century of the country’s existence no one had the title of
ambassador. America’s foreign commercial interests grew slowly and its political interests abroad even more
slowly. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century there was a realization that American
interests were both too broad and long term in nature, to allow its diplomatic representation to be pursued
simply through political appointees who changed with each administration. To protect those interests, a
slow process of gradual professionalization began, which reached its peak at mid 20th century.
To illustrate the impact of economic development on diplomatic appointments, Figure 2 charts real per
5See Herring (2008: 96).
3capita GDP against diplomatic and consular appointments. Real per capita GDP shows an acceleration
at the point where the USA began the process of switching from consular, to more formal diplomatic
representation.6
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
The long process of professionalization of both the diplomatic and the consular corps was given its start
early in the 20th century, most notably under President William Howard Taft.7
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
Table 1 shows the eﬀect on the number of career ambassadors of the eﬀorts of Taft and his successors
to create a more professional diplomatic corps during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. The number of
diplomatic missions steadily rises, but those headed by an ambassador increase far more rapidly until they
constitute over three quarters of the total. Appointments where the chief of mission bears the title of
minister correspondingly decrease, until eventually all embassies had an ambassador in charge. Notably the
percentage of ambassadors that are career oﬃcers also increases dramatically.
America emerged from World War II as a global power with global interests. This is reﬂected in the fact
that by the middle of the 20th century, the percentage of career ambassadors reached about two thirds of
the total number appointed by the president. As Table 2 illustrates, it has stayed at a ratio of 70 percent
career and 30 percent political ambassadors ever since, regardless of the party in power.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.
While the ratio between political versus career appointees has remained at about the same level it has
been since Eisenhower, there have been further attempts to professionalize the ranks of ambassadors. Under
the Carter administration, the Foreign Service Act of 1980 was passed which states:
“An individual appointed or assigned to be a chief of mission should possess clearly demon-
strated competence to perform the duties of a chief of mission, including, to the maximum extent
practicable, a useful knowledge of the principal language or dialect of the country in which the
individual is to serve, and knowledge and understanding of the history, the culture, the economic
and political institutions, and the interests of that country and its people.
Given the qualiﬁcations speciﬁed in (the proceeding) paragraph, positions as chief of mission
should normally be accorded to career members of the Service, though circumstance will warrant
appointments from time to time of qualiﬁed individuals who are not career members of the
Service.
Contributions to political campaigns should not be a factor in the appointment of an individual
as a chief of mission.”
The 1980 Act had no impact, however, at least in terms of the overall percentage. Before the act was
passed, the number of political appointees from the Eisenhower through the Ford administration averaged
30.5 percent. From Carter through George W. Bush it averaged half a percentage point higher.
This pattern continues to date. As a candidate, Obama frequently talked about the need to change
the way Washington does business. He explicitly criticized the practice of giving ambassadorships to big
campaign contributors, consistent with the Foreign Service Act of 1980. After he was elected, however, it
quickly became clear the practice was not going to end and may well remain at, or even above, the average of
his ten predecessors. In his ﬁrst two years in oﬃce, according to the American Foreign Service Association,
his appointees were 60 percent career oﬃcers and 40 percent political appointees.8
The persistence of political appointments to ambassadorships, and its stable level at 30% of all appointees,
calls for an explanation. While there are a number of potential underlying determining factors, what stands
6The absolute level of real GDP, and export activity on the part of the USA, are similarly plausibly correlated with the rising
level of diplomatic representation by the USA. We also considered the reported quality of American institutions as reported
by the POLITYIV data set of Marshall et al (2010), against diplomatic and consular appointments. Speciﬁcally we considered
the DEMOC measure of institutionalized democracy, POLITY2, the XRCOMP measure of the competitiveness of executive
recruitment, the XCONST measure of executive constraints (Decision Rules), and the PARCOMP measure of competitiveness
of participation. None of the institutional quality indicators are plausibly correlated with the level of diplomatic representation
of the USA.
7In each of his four State of the Union speeches from 1909 to 1912, Taft spoke about what he had done to improve the State
Department and urged Congress to help institutionalize reform.
8Note, however, that this does not mean that over the course of his presidency Obama will appoint a higher percentage of
political ambassadors than his predecessors. Historically, the pattern has been that the percentage of political appointees to
ambassadorships is higher immediately after inauguration of the president, than it is over the full term of service.
4o u ti st h a tt h ec o s t so fﬁnancing a presidential campaign are substantial and growing. In the last presidential
election, the two major party candidates spent a combined total of more than a billion dollars. The selling
of ambassadorships is too lucrative a bargaining tool for presidential candidates to use in raising additional
campaign funding, to be easily relinquished.
3 Two Hypotheses - Expected Empirical Regularities
So what determines whether the appointment to a particular posting will be political, as opposed to a career
diplomat?
We postulate the following hypotheses, relating to the preferences of political appointees, and to the
State Department respectively.
From the perspective of the political appointee, it is unlikely that the appointee (who may be donating
substantial money, and soliciting donations by friends), will be willing to be sent to an obscure and dangerous
part of the world. Instead, their preference will be to go to countries that have strong name recognition
(think bragging rights), and in which they will not have to worry about terrorist attacks or threats to their
health.
Alternatively, from the Department of State’s point of view, if an ambassador turns out to manifest
negligible competence (presuming that the probability of competence is non-negligibly higher for career than
political appointments), it is best to have that person in a country where their ability to do damage to
American interests is constrained. There are two ways to attempt to minimize the downside potential of an
ambassador’s inexperience and inability. The ﬁrst is to post that person to a country where he or she can
be worked around, due to the existence of good communications with the country receiving the posting, or
which may be easily reached by air and with a capable embassy in Washington, so that there exist means of
conducting diplomacy alternative to the ambassador. The second is to assign the person to a country that
is unimportant enough that negligible competence is matched by the negligible signiﬁcance of inability.
One of the reasons why the practice of political appointments to ambassadorial posts may have proved so
stable over time, is that, provided that the State Department condones the appointment of political ambas-
sadors to desirable (say high income) postings, where strong diplomatic corps are present, these preferences
of the State Department and of political appointees prove to be substantially aligned with one another. In the
case of appointees, the preference should be for "attractive" destinations, most likely to be satisﬁed by high-
income, developed countries, that carry strong name recognition by virtue of strong historical association
with the USA, or countries that are safe, of attractive climate, and are located in the near abroad.
Countries with whom the State Department is likely to have sound communications, of long-established
historical provenance, such that the contribution of the speciﬁc individual in the ambassadorial post is not
crucial, are also likely to be countries in the high-income developed world, or those in the near abroad that
have fallen into the American sphere of inﬂuence for a lengthy period of time.
The two categories of countries that satisfy the two sets of criteria are either Western Europe (or perhaps
the OECD more broadly construed), or countries in the Caribbean and Central America.9
The two hypotheses regarding the interests of appointees and the State Department therefore suggest
two empirical regularities that should be observable in the data:
• The distribution of political appointees should be non-random across indicators of the desirability of
appointment or ease of access and communication. Such indicators might be provided by measures of
economic development, such as the gross domestic product per capita of the country of assignment, or
the intensity of tourist activity in the country of appointment.
• The distribution of political appointees should be non-random across indicators of the geographical
location of the country to which the appointee is being posted.
A consideration of the descriptive data lends credibility to these hypotheses. Table 3 shows the breakdown
of diplomatic appointments across political and career appointees for all regions for the last half century.
9There are a few exceptions. Cuba would not qualify and there have not been full diplomatic relations since shortly after
Castro came to power. In addition, Haiti has a long history of being less than pleasant and so it has received a career ambassador
95 percent of the time.
5INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.
The Caribbean in general has been the most popular region for political appointees. Since 1960 there
have been 152 people named to be ambassador to those nations. Of that number, 111 or 73 percent have been
political appointees. Worldwide political appointees have accounted for 31 percent of the ambassadorships.
Yet they have been disproportionately attracted to the tropical islands of the Caribbean and Oceania and to
the economically developed nations of Western Europe and the Paciﬁc. There is also a preference for North
and Central America. But as for the rest of the globe, where most of the poor countries of the world are
located, political appointees fall well below the worldwide average. The extreme case is Central Asia, where
there were no ambassadors until those nations gained their independence upon the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Since then there has never been a political appointee sent as ambassador to the region.
The appointments process we outline represents a clear departure from a classical view of public adminis-
tration based on technical eﬃciency,10 and accords signiﬁcant space for political interference in the conduct
of the public administrative processes instead.11 An obvious question this characterization therefore raises is
how the practice of political appointees to diplomatic posts conforms to theoretical models of administrative
functions.
The most obvious starting point is provided by the principal-agent model. Two foundational assumptions
of the principal-agent framework are the existence of information asymmetries between the principal and
the agent,12 and that there is a goal conﬂict between the principal and agent.13 Under this conception,
the elected administration (the president), would act as a principal to the bureaucratic agency (the State
Department), who in turn could be thought of as a principal to the appointee (agent) to a diplomatic post.
Political appointees to diplomatic posts might serve an administration as a means of lowering the information
asymmetry the president faces with respect to the State Department, by serving as a monitoring system on
the State Department. The State Department, in turn, by limiting political appointees to those diplomatic
posts in which signiﬁcant information ﬂows independent of the ambassador exist (see the discussion above),
itself constrains the extent of the information asymmetry between itself (as principal) and its agent (the am-
bassador).14 Principal agent models have certainly found application in the literature, including in analyses
of campaign contributions.15
The principal-agent framework, while widely used, has also faced demands at least for augmentation. In
Waterman and Meier (1998) the suggestion is that both information asymmetry and goal conﬂict may not
always apply to administrative bureaucratic settings. By distinguishing between circumstances in which there
is, and is not, goal conﬂict between principal and agent, and in which both the principal and the agent may
face either little or considerable information asymmetry, they provide a 2 × 2 × 2 matrix characterization
of administrative conditions, of which the principal-agent framework is one (goal conﬂict, principal high
information asymmetry, agent low information asymmetry). The intensity and form of strategic interaction
that characterizes principal - agent situations, is therefore potentially modulated, either because goal conﬂict
between the two players does not apply, aligning their interests, or because information asymmetry between
the two players is absent due to either mutual ignorance, or because both agents have access to much the
same information.
Particularly the possibility of goal alignment between players, has received attention in the political
science literature. That public managers may (often) be motivated by the public good has a long tradition,16
10See for instance Weber (1947).
11Of course, the literature has long recognized that the dichotomy between pure technical eﬃciency on the one hand, and
political interference on the other, is artiﬁcial in empirical application - see for instance Mountjoy and Watson (1995).
12These information asymmetries might relate to uncertainty and bounded rationality on the part of the principal (see Simon,
1947), to the expertise of the bureaucracy (see Weber, 1947, and Bendor et al, 1985, 1987), or to the existence of private interests
on the part of the agent, that are not transparent to the principal, such as in the Klitgaard (1988) model of corruption.
13This entails a move beyond a Pigouvian (1920) conception of agents as directly representing the social objective function,
to a view consistent with Stigler (1970), in which agents pursue private interests.
14In addition, to maintain its credibility as a monitoring agency of political appointees to diplomatic posts, it would have to
show that it has the resolve to terminate ineﬃcient appointees. See the discussion in Bertelli and Smith (2010) in the context
of contracting. The state department has shown precisely such behavior, in forcing the termination of the ambassadorship of
Cynthia Stroum in Luxembourg in January 2011.
15See for instance Witko (2011) on the impact of campaign contributions on government contracting to private sector service
providers. Kelleher and Yackee (2009) point out that the use of contracting raises the ability of contracting agents to inﬂuence,
and in the limit to change of objectives of the principal (the government agency).
16Recall Pigou (1920).
6and continues to be argued for in the literature.17 The result is either the removal, or at least a reduction
in the goal conﬂict between principal and agent, and the proposal of a principal - steward framework in
its stead.18 The need for monitoring the activity of the steward by the principal to ensure compliance
with the objectives of the principal is reduced, and emphasis can shift closer to pure technical eﬃciency
considerations. In our context a principal-stewardship relationship could conceivably exist between the
political administration (president) and the State Department. The most likely instance, though, is goal
conﬂuence between the president and political appointees to diplomatic posts, since by self-selection both
parties coordinated on broadly shared political and ideological perspectives during the political campaign
of the president.19 Thus a combination of principal-agent (president-State Department; State Department-
ambassador) and principal-stewardship (president-ambassador) relations might come to characterize political
appointees to diplomatic postings.
However, even should we concede that substantial goal conﬂuence between a principal and his agent
may be present, or may emerge through repeated interaction between the two, it is diﬃcult to suppose
that such conﬂuence will be complete. Some private interest on the part of the agent is always likely to be
present. To this extent, the classic or standard principal-agent framework remains pertinent. Perhaps a more
plausible modulation on the principal-agent framework is not so much the presence of shared goals between
the parties involved in ambassadorial appointments, but that the extent of information asymmetry between
the principals and the agents is relatively attenuated. The president obtains additional information from the
political appointee, diminishing the strategic advantage of the State Department vis-a-vis the administration.
The State Department in turn obtains additional information from embassies in Washington DC, as well
as the career diplomats stationed with political appointees in foreign capital cities, again diminishing the
strategic advantage of the ambassador vis-a-vis the State Department. The result is the form of strategic
interaction that Waterman and Meier (1998) term advocacy settings — where the bureaucracy becomes one
political actor amongst many (here including at least the presidency and the ambassador), and the politics
is one of ideas, and the strategic use of information in settling disputes.
Under the standard principal - agent framework, the relation between the parties to political appointments
to diplomatic posts is clear. The president gains campaign contributions, those providing the contributions
receive a pay-oﬀ in the form of desirable diplomatic postings. The State Department also acts as a classic
principal, monitoring its agent (the ambassador) through the professional diplomatic service, and foreign em-
bassy staﬀ in Washington DC. Where we allow for the emergence of a principal-stewardship relation between
the president and the ambassador, it emerges that the political administration obtains an additional beneﬁt
from politically appointed ambassadors: a monitoring of the State Department agent to the presidency.
Therefore, since the State Department has evolved relatively reliable means to limit the strategic capacities
of politically appointed ambassadors, and the presidency stands to gain both campaign contributions and the
possibility of improved monitoring of the State Department from political appointees to diplomatic posts, it
is not diﬃcult to understand why the practice persists.
4T h e D a t a
Ambassadorial postings data employed by the current study are those for the Obama administration, as of
January 2011.
Our data covers all countries with whom the United States has diplomatic relations in 2011, a total of
164 countries - listed in Appendix A.20
We employ data obtained from the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), classifying ambas-
sadorial appointments as either career or political.
Political appointees are almost always given ambassadorships for one of three possible reasons.
17See for instance DiIulio (1994).
18See for instance Van Slyke (2007).
19It is conceivable that a principal-stewardship relation might evolve between the state department and political appointees,
due to repeated interaction over the tenure of the appointment. Since it seems less plausible that goal conﬂuence would occur
a priori, we attach less weight to such a dynamic evolution of shared goals, since it would be diﬃcult to plan systematically.
20Note that some embassies cover more than one country, and with some - eg. Iran, North Korea, etc. -the US has no
diplomatic relations.
7First, they may have personally provided ﬁnancial contributions toward the campaign of the President.
Second, given the legal restrictions placed on personal campaign contributions,21 they may have played a
coordinating function in raising campaign contributions, "bundling" campaign contributions to the Presi-
dential campaign. "Bundlers" are campaign contributors who, after bumping against personal contribution
limits, turn to friends, associates and anyone else who’s willing to contribute, to deliver the ﬁnal contribu-
tions raised to the campaign in a single lump sum.22 Though these donors direct more money to candidates
than anyone else, disclosure of bundling activity is spotty at best, since it is not legally required and is left
substantially to the discretion of candidates instead.23
Data on personal campaign contributions is published by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).24 By
contrast, data on bundled contributions is considerably more diﬃcult to obtain. With limited exceptions
the FEC does not collect information on "bundlers." Instead this data has to come from the campaigns
themselves when they choose to release it. The bundling of campaign contributions employed for the present
study comes from the Center of Responsive Politics and other sources.25
However, not all political ambassadors are appointed for their campaign contributions. Appendix B lists
the 44 political appointee ambassadors named by Obama through January 2011. Of those 18 appointees, or
41 percent, made or bundled less than $100,000 in campaign contributions. Thus while many ambassadorial
appointees are campaign contributors, some are personal friends of the president or are appointed for political
reasons. This last group is comprised of political allies, former elected oﬃcials, those who bring racial and/or
gender diversity to a president’s appointments, or strike a responsive chord with some particular constituency
of the president’s party, such as activists in minority or gay rights. Lastly, there is also the occasional foreign
policy expert or staﬀ person, usually with time spent at an independent think tank like the Brookings
Institution or the Council on Foreign Relations, providing foreign policy expertise from a base outside the
career Foreign Service.
The third type of political appointee is thus one with a political connection to the president, other than
simply being a donor, due to being a personal friend, an activist member of a minority group or other salient
political interest group, a retired general, or some other type of connection.26
Data on the per capita gross domestic product of target countries of postings is obtained from the CIA
factbook 2010. Data on the number of tourists per annum is also obtained from the CIA factbook.27 We
also employ the income-level classiﬁcation provided by the World Bank,28 and a classiﬁcation of country
postings into distinct geographical regions.29
Finally, we also employ data on hardship allowances and danger pay associated with diplomatic postings.
The data is obtained from the US State Department.
Hardship pay is awarded where the local conditions diﬀer substantially from the environment in the United
States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. This allowance is to
compensate for spending time in a country known for crime, disease, poverty, isolation or other local features
21See the speciﬁcation of these by the Federal Election Commission — http://www.fec.gov.
22See the explanation of bundling in http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/bundlers.php?id=N00006424
23The result in the most recent Presidential campaign was that Obama and McCain posted information on "bundlers" by
ranges, with the top ranges being simply "$500,000 or more." Together, 536 bundlers directed at least $75,750,000 to McCain,
and 560 gathered at least $76,500,000 for Obama.
24See http://www.fec.gov.
25While data on personal campaign contributions is available from the Federal Election Commission, data on campaign con-
tributions was obtained from a number of sources, including www.opensecrets.org, www.campaignmoney.org, www.allgov.org.
26Strictly, the political connection does not always have to be with the president himself. David Thorne, the current ambas-
sador to Italy, for instance, has less than $30,000 in political contributions on record. However, he was Senator John Kerry’s
roommate at Yale, as well as his ex brother-in law. Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, can impact
on who gets an ambassadorship and who does not, and would have the inﬂuence to have a friend, even one without a signiﬁcant
connection to the president, named ambassador.
27We note that for a number of countries there is no recorded tourism. These countries included Afghanistan, Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Mauritania, Montenegro, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste. One option was to
simply treat these countries as having missing data. Another, was to code the countries as having 0 tourists. While this
introduces measurement error in some degree, given the list of countries aﬀected, tourism is not likely to have been signiﬁcant
(there is a strong correlation with the presence or aftermath of war or civil conﬂict), rendering the error small. Moreover, the
number of cases that are aﬀected in this manner, is in any event very small. We note, however, that we reestimated our results
by excluding countries with the missing tourism data. Our results are robust to the exclusion.
28Low Income, Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income, High Income OECD, High Income non-OECD.
29East Asia & Paciﬁc, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Caribbean, Central America, South America, Central Asia, South
Asia, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa.
8that make it a particularly diﬃcult place to live. It is paid as a percentage of base pay in increments of 5%
up to 35%. Of the 164 embassies in our data, 127 have conditions suﬃciently diﬃcult to warrant some level
of hardship pay. The ratings of postings in terms of hardship allowances is reported in Appendix C.
Danger pay is compensation for serving in places where the threat to embassy personnel of becoming a
victim of violence because of civil unrest, terrorism, drug traﬃckers or some other cause is deemed consid-
erable. It takes the form of a bonus of between 15 and 35 percent of base pay. The ratings of postings in
terms of danger pay is reported in Appendix D.
5 Estimation Methodology
In the empirical estimation section of the paper we confront two sets of related questions.
In the ﬁrst, we estimate:




1 if ∃ a political appointment, with probability Pr(Y =1 )=P
0 if @ a political appointment, with probability Pr(Y =0 )=1− P
with the vector of explanatory variables Xi for each country i, provided by GDP per capita of the country
associated with a posting (dented GDPPC), the number of tourist visits per annum (denoted TOURISM),
the hardship allowance associated with a posting (denoted HARDSHIP), the danger pay associated with
a posting (denoted DANGER), as well as the World Bank income class into which a posting falls (Low
Income, Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income, High Income OECD, High Income non-OECD),
and geographical location of a posting (East Asia & Paciﬁc, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Caribbean,
Central America, South America, Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Sub-
Saharan Africa). Our distributional assumption governing the random i.i.d.error term is the logistic, Fut =
(exp(Xtβ))/(1 + exp(Xtβ)).
From speciﬁcation (1) we can derive the marginal gain in probability that an appointment is political, as
GDP per capita, tourist visits, the hardship allowance and danger pay increase, and the marginal probability
impact due to a posting falling into a particular income class, or geographical area.
In essence, the results of the ﬁrst set of estimations results in description.
In the second set of estimations, we consider the diﬀerential impact that the diﬀerent types of political
appointments have on the nature of the posting that political appointees receive. In this instance we estimate:
Yi = γ0 + γ1PolConnecti + γ2PersContribi + γ3Bundleri + ui (2)
where Yi denotes either the continuous variables GDPPC, TOURISM, HARDSHIP or DANGER, or one of
the dichotomous variables given by the World Bank income category, or with geographical location:
Yi =
½
1 if i ∈ j, with probability Pr(Y =1 )=P
0 if i / ∈ j, with probability Pr(Y =0 )=1− P (3)
ji so n eo f :
½
Low Income; Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income,





1 if i ∈ g, with probability Pr(Y =1 )=P
0 if i / ∈ g, with probability Pr(Y =0 )=1− P




East Asia & Paciﬁc; Eastern Europe, Western Europe,
Caribbean, Central America, South America,




where the dependent variable is categorical, our distributional assumption is again logistic. PolConnecti
denotes whether the appointee to country i is politically connected to the President in some manner,
PersContrib measures the magnitude of personal campaign contributions, Bundler the magnitude of bun-
dled campaign contributions.
9In this instance the focus is on whether the diﬀerent forms of political connection have a diﬀerential impact
on the GDP, tourism hardship and danger pay measures, and on the marginal gain in probability that the
appointment will be in a speciﬁc World Bank income class, or in a particular geographical area. Therefore,
while we cannot answer the question of whether campaign contributions are able to secure diplomatic postings
(since we lack data on all campaign contributors, including those without postings), we are able to establish
whether the magnitude of campaign contributions is associated signiﬁcantly with the nature of the postings
that political appointees realize.
6 Estimation Results
Our estimation results provide answers to three separate questions.
The ﬁrst set of results explore which characteristics of diplomatic postings inﬂuence the probability that
the appointee to the diplomatic post is political rather than a career civil servant. In doing so, we consider
the impact of per capital GDP, the number of tourist visits, hardship and danger pay allowances, the income
class of the country posting, as well as the geographical location of the post.
Second, we examine how the three diﬀerent forms of political association with an administration, either
personal political connection to senior members of the administration, or campaign contributions in either
personal or bundled form, impact on the nature of the diplomatic posting that the political appointees
receive.
6.1 Factors inﬂuencing the probability that a posting will be political
We begin with the question of what impact various characteristics of postings have on the probability that
the appointee to the posting will be political rather than a career diplomat. In eﬀect we explore how post
characteristics are distributed across career and political diplomats.
6.1.1 Income, tourism, hardship allowances and danger pay
The most basic question we confront is whether the desirability of a posting impacts on the probability that
the appointee is political.
Accordingly we estimate (1), with the set of explanatory variables given by per capita gross domestic
product, the number of tourists, the hardship allowance associated with ambassadorial postings, and the
danger pay allowance associated with ambassadorial postings.
Results are reported in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.
Our baseline ﬁndings are ﬁrst that an increased level of per capita GDP associated with a posting,
statistically signiﬁcantly increases the probability that the appointment will be political - see column 1 of
Table 4. Second, that an increased level of tourism associated with a posting, statistically signiﬁcantly
increases the probability that the appointment will be political - see column 2 of Table 4. Third, that
an increased level of hardship allowance associated with a posting, statistically signiﬁcantly lowers the
probability that the appointment will be political - see column 3 of Table 4. Finally, an increased level of
danger pay allowance associated with a posting, indicates a lower probability that the appointment will be
political, though the association is not statistically signiﬁcant - see column 4 of Table 4.
The statistical signiﬁcance of the positive impact of per capita GDP is not robust to controlling for either
tourism, or the hardship allowance in a multivariate speciﬁcation - see columns 5, 7 and 9 of Table 4. By
contrast both tourism and the hardship allowance prove robust to the multivariate setting, with both sign
and statistical signiﬁcance proving invariant to the multivariate speciﬁcation employed - see columns 6, 7
and 8 of Table 4. We note, however, that in the multivariate settings the impact of tourism is reduced
(approximately halved). The danger pay allowance remains statistically insigniﬁcant throughout. With the
exception of the per capita GDP variable, therefore, the results appear robust as to sign and signiﬁcance,
though in the case of the TOURISM variable the magnitude of the implied impact on the probability of a
political appointment approximately halves in the multivariate settings.
106.1.2 More on income
An alternative, and perhaps more appropriate, interpretation of the GDP measure might be one which is
categorical rather than continuous. What might matter in determining the desirability of postings is not the
variation of per-capita GDP per se, but certain categories of countries in terms of the standard of living that is
associated with living there. For instance, we might wish to distinguish between low, middle and high-income
countries in terms of the desirability of postings for appointees. To explore this possibility, we categorize
our sample of countries in terms of their World Bank classiﬁcation as a Low Income, Lower Middle Income,
Upper Middle Income, High Income OECD and High Income Non-OECD country, as classiﬁed in 2006. In
using the exogenous World Bank classiﬁcation, we preclude the possibility of an endogenous classiﬁcation of
country income status correlated with the outcome variable.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.
We report the results in Table 5. Once again we employ a logit speciﬁcation, with POLITICO as the
dependent variable, in this instance employing dummy variables for the income status on the RHS of the
speciﬁcation.
In terms of the bivariate associations (columns 1 through 5 of Table 5), the results indicate that the
probability of a political appointee is statistically signiﬁcantly lower for Low Income and Lower Middle
Income countries, and statistically signiﬁcantly greater for Upper Middle Income and High Income OECD
countries. While the probability of a political appointment is positively correlated with High Income Non-
OECD countries, the association is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Once we control for all income statuses simultaneously (our reference category is High Income Non-
OECD), the statistically signiﬁcant negative impact on the probability of a political appointment of a Low
Income and Lower Middle Income posting (now relative to High Income Non-OECD countries) remains,
while High Income OECD postings maintains their statistically signiﬁcant positive impact on the probability
of a political posting (again relative to High Income Non—OECD countries) - see column 6 of Table 5.
Once we control for TOURISM and HARDSHIP in addition to the four income categories, only the High
Income OECD posting category maintains its statistical signiﬁcance, and maintains its positive impact on
the probability that the appointment to the post will be political.30
The implication of the ﬁndings of Tables 4 and 5 thus appears to be that both income status and tourism
matter in determining the probability of a political appointment to a post. However, the impact of per
capita GDP is not such as to steadily increase the probability of a political appointment. Instead, once the
attractiveness of a posting as determined by its attractiveness as a tourist destination and an associated
hardship allowance is controlled for, the probability of a political appointment is increased only by posts in
high-income OECD countries.
In eﬀect, political appointments occur in high-income OECD countries, that are attractive tourist desti-
nations and are associated with low hardship allowances.
6.1.3 Geography
An additional set of factors that might inﬂuence political appointments are related to geography.
The possibility being explored here is that the probability of a political appointment may vary across
diﬀerent geographical regions of the world. To examine this possibility, we again consider a categorical
classiﬁcation of countries, assigning each to a geographical region of the world. Once again, we employ a
World Bank classiﬁcation of countries, in order to avoid the possibility of an endogenous classiﬁcation of
country geographical status correlated with the outcome variable.
The geographical posting categories we consider are: Caribbean (6 countries); Central America (8 coun-
tries); Central Asia (9 countries); East Asia & Paciﬁc (22 countries); Eastern Europe (22 countries); Middle
East and North Africa (19 countries); South America (12 countries); South Asia (6 countries); Sub-Saharan
Africa (42 countries); Western Europe (18 countries). We note at the outset that a number of these categories
have small samples associated with them, and hence are likely to face poor statistical power characteristics.
While we report results for these categories, we address the small sample size problem below.31
30We note that the number of political appointments in some of the categories is small. Statistical insigniﬁcance may thus
be a reﬂection of a lack of statistical power, rather than the absence of an association.
31Note that this categorization eﬀectively excludes Canada, which is the sole country falling into North America, and which is
not grouped with the Central American or Caribbean countries. In the aggregated geographical areas analyzed below, Canada
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Results are reported in Table 6. We continue to employ a logit speciﬁcation, with POLITICO as depen-
dent variable, and employing dummy variables for the geographical regions.
The bivariate associations (columns 1 through 10 of Table 6) suggest that only four regions potentially
impact statistically signiﬁcantly on the probability that the appointment to a post will be political. Both
postings in Western Europe and the Caribbean statistically signiﬁcantly increase the probability that a
posting will be political, though the Caribbean association is weaker both quantitatively and statistically.
Conversely, postings in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa statistically signiﬁcantly decrease the proba-
bility that a posting will be political.
These ﬁndings are robust to the multivariate speciﬁcation which controls for all geographical areas (see
column 11 of Table 6 - East Asia & Paciﬁc is the reference category), though the Caribbean association is
statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10% level in the multivariate speciﬁcation.
The implication to emerge is that political appointments are more likely in Western Europe and the
Caribbean, and less probable in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
To address the concern of poor statistical power due to the small number of countries falling into some
of the geographical categories, we also consider some higher levels of aggregation. Speciﬁcally, we consider
countries in the Caribbean and Central America jointly with Canada (one might think of this category as
the near abroad: Caribbean, North & Central America - now 15 countries), Central and South Asia (now
15 countries), the Middle East and North Africa, Central and South Asia (now 34 countries), and South
America and Sub-Saharan Africa (now 54 countries).
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE.
We report the resultant ﬁndings in Table 7.
Findings for these higher levels of aggregation consistently conﬁrm a positive impact on the probability
of a political posting for postings in the Caribbean, North & Central America, and in Western Europe (see
columns 1, 3, 5 of Table 7). Sub-Saharan Africa is consistently associated with a lower probability of a
political appointment, regardless of whether we control for the region individually (column 1 of Table 7),
or jointly with South America (column 3, 5 of Table 7), while South American countries, while implying a
negative impact on the probability of a political appointment, are statistically signiﬁcantly associated only
once grouped with Sub-Saharan Africa (see c o l u m n1v e r s u sc o l u m n s3a n d5o fT a b l e7 ) . 32 By contrast,
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, Central and South Asia consistently
have a statistically insigniﬁcant impact on the probability of an appointment being political, regardless of
whether we control for the region individually, or at increasing levels of aggregation (see columns 1 through
6 of Table 7).
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we also control for the High Income OECD, TOURISM and HARDSHIP
status of the countries in our sample - results are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 7.
The core ﬁnding to emerge is that the positive impact on the probability of a political appointment if
the posting is in the Caribbean, North & Central America, is robust to the controls for income, tourism and
hardship allowance eﬀects (in fact, the positive impact on the probability increases). By contrast, both the
Western European and the Sub-Saharan African and joint Sub-Saharan African and South American impact
on the probability of a political appointment does not survive the introduction of the additional controls.33
In the case of Western Europe, a likely reason is the high correlation between the High Income OECD
category and classiﬁcation under Western Europe (correlation = 0.81), with the associated implications of
multicollinearity for standard errors in estimation for both the geographical and the income control. In the
case of Sub-Saharan Africa and South America this is not the case, and the inference is straightforwardly
that there is no independent eﬀect of geography on the probability of a political posting from these two
regions, over and above that captured by income, tourism and hardship allowance eﬀects.
The inference is thus that postings in the Caribbean, North & Central America increase the probability
of a political appointment. By contrast, it is not possible to statistically unambiguously separate the impact
of high-income OECD and geographical factors in the case of Western Europe. In eﬀect, it is not clear
whether it is geography, or income, or both that are important in raising the probability of a political
falls into the Caribbean, North & Central America region.
32This may well be a reﬂection of the small sample size (12) for South America.
33None of the ﬁndings for Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, Central and South Asia are
aﬀected by the additional controls.
12appointment. However, high income Western European countries are more probable to have a political
appointee to ambassadorial posts, than a career diplomat.
6.1.4 Conclusions and the probability impacts
Implications of the preceding analysis, are that the probability of a political appointment to a posting: rises
in the per capita income of the posting,34 in the attractiveness of the posting as a tourist destination, as the
hardship allowance associated with a posting declines, with West European postings,35 and for postings in
the Caribbean, Central America and Canada.
It remains for us to isolate the impact of changes in these variables on the concrete probability of a political
appointment being realized. Since the impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the probability value
is non-linear across the domain of the explanatory variable values, we report both the density (probability that
the appointment will be political) and the marginal density (change in the probability that the appointment
will be political) across the sample range of values that the explanatory variables assume in our data.
We report results in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.
For the GDPPC variable, inferences correspond to the results of column 1 of Table 4 (the bivariate
association), and the multivariate speciﬁcation of column 7 of Table 4, evaluated at the sample mean values of
other explanatory variables in the speciﬁcation. While there is some question about the statistical signiﬁcance
of the continuous measure of income (see the discussion above), the implied impact of increases in per capita
GDP on the probability of a political appointment are strong. In the bivariate association, the probability
of a political appointment exceeds 90% for levels of per capita GDP in excess of approximately $50,000.
Even in the case of the weaker association that emerges for the multivariate association, the increase in
the probability of a political appointment associated with a move from a posting in the poorest to one
in the richest nation in the sample is in the order of 50%. Implied probabilities of political appointments
associated with postings that in the World Bank income categories, also conﬁrm the strong decline in the
probability that a post will have a political appointment for low-income and lower middle-income countries,
and by contrast the strong increase in the probability for upper middle-, and particularly high-income OECD
countries. (for upper middle-income countries the probability of a political appointment is 40%, for high
income OECD countries 87%).
Results for the TOURISM variable correspond to column 2 of Table 4 (the bivariate association), and
the multivariate speciﬁcation of column 7 of Table 4, again evaluated at the sample mean values of other
explanatory variables in the speciﬁcation. Here the impact on the probability of a political appointment
is even stronger than it is for per capita GDP. The probability of a political appointment rises to above
90% for tourism in excess of approximately 24 million (corresponding approximately to Mexico or Russia
in our sample) for the simple bivariate case, and approximately 42 million (corresponding to approximately
Hungary in our sample) for the multivariate case.
Symmetrically probability values for the HARDSHIP variable, correspond to column 3 of Table 4 (the
bivariate association), and column 7 of Table 4 (the multivariate association), evaluated at the sample mean
values of other explanatory variables in the speciﬁcation. Again, the impact of declining hardship allowances
on the probability of a political appointment are strong. For the bivariate case, a reduction of the hardship
allowance from 35% (the sample maximum) to 0% (the sample minimum), is associated with an increase in
the probability of a political appointment of approximately 60%, and for the multivariate case this is only
slightly lower at 50%.
Finally, the implied probabilities of political appointments in diﬀerent geographical areas, conﬁrm the
strong impact that postings in Western Europe, the Caribbean and Central America have on the probability
of a political appointment, with the probabilities that the posting will be political of 89%, 67% and 50% for
the three regions respectively.
The inference to emerge from this section is therefore that as the desirability of a posting increases, as
measured either by the per capita GDP or high income OECD status of the posting, or the desirability
of the posting as a tourist destination, or a diminished hardship allowance associated with the post, so
the probability that the appointee will be political rather than a career diplomat, increases also. Finally,
34Though the real impact of per capita GDP is associated with High Income OECD country postings.
35Though this geographical eﬀect is diﬃcult to separate from the high income OECD country eﬀect.
13postings in Western Europe, the Caribbean and Central America are also associated with substantially higher
probabilities of political appointments.
6.2 The link between political factors and the nature of diplomatic postings
In the ﬁnal analytical section of the paper, we ask how the three diﬀerent forms of political association
with an administration, either personal political connection to senior members of the administration, or
either personal or bundled campaign contributions, impact on the nature of the diplomatic posting that the
political appointees receive.
6.2.1 Desirability of postings: per capita GDP, tourism, hardship allowances and danger pay
In our data set a political appointment is due either to political connections between the appointee and the
president, or because of personal or bundled campaign contributions to the presidential election campaign.
We begin by examining how these distinct features of a political appointment are associated with the
characteristics of a diplomatic posting, as measured by per capita GDP of the country in which the post is
located, its tourist volumes, as well as hardship and danger pay allowances.
Results are reported in Table 8.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE.
Consideration of the results of Table 8 conﬁrms that all three dimensions are separately statistically
signiﬁcant, and of consistent sign, conﬁrming that any of political connectedness, or the two types of cam-
paign contributions are likely to secure more desirable postings in the per capita GDP, tourist destination
and hardship allowance sense. Column 4 conﬁrms that none of the three types of political connection is
individually statistically signiﬁcantly related to danger pay allowance.
Estimation results suggest that appointees who are politically connected to the president can expect
to receive postings that on average are $5,866 higher in per capita GDP terms than career appointees
(approximately the diﬀerence between Israel or Italy and the United Kingdom), have 11.12 million more
tourists (approximately the diﬀerence between Germany and the United Kingdom), and on average have
hardship allowances 6.59% lower than career appointees (approximately the diﬀerence between Afghanistan
and somewhere between Nigeria and Serbia).
In terms of campaign contributions, the greater pay-oﬀ appears to attach to bundled rather than personal
contributions. An increase in personal contributions generates an improved quality of posting, with each
$100,000 of measurable campaign contributions improving the posting by $2,257 in per capita GDP terms,
by 1.19 million tourists, or lowering the hardship allowance by 1.73%. By contrast, a $100,000 increase
in bundled campaign contributions improve postings by $3,987 in per capita GDP terms, by 1.65 million
tourists, and lowering the hardship allowance by 2.58%.
While the diﬀerence between personal and bundled contributions may appear surprising at ﬁrst sight,
it may be partially explained by the fact that mean values of personal contributions are considerably lower
than the mean value of bundled contributions (approximately $190,000 versus $470,000), and since bun-
dled contributions may be inherently valued since they serve as the basis of introducing a greater pool of
contributors to the campaign.
6.2.2 Desirability of postings: income level of postings
In Table 9 we again consider the possibility that what matters for political appointees, is not a continuous
range of per capita GDP, but simply in what income class the posting is located. Estimation results control
for the range of political appointment characteristics on which we have data.
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE.
The important question is how the diﬀerent form of political appointments, viz. personal connection,
and the magnitude of private and bundling political campaign contributions, impact diﬀerentially on the
desirability of the diplomatic posting.
The fact that an appointee has political connections to the president, raises the probability that their
posting will occur in upper middle income countries relative to that of a career diplomat from 15% to 40%.
While this is the only statistically signiﬁcant association, the remainder of the estimated coeﬃcients on
political connections only lowers the probability of postings in lower middle income countries. The implied
14probability values are reported in Figure 4. Quantitatively signiﬁcant impacts occur only for lower middle
income (career = 39% probability, political appointees = 18% probability), upper middle income (career =
15% probability, political appointees = 40% probability), and perhaps for high income non-OECD countries
(career = 7% probability, political appointees = 17% probability).
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.
Personal as well as bundled contributions statistically signiﬁcantly raise only the probability of a posting
in high income OECD countries - though in the case of bundled contributions there is a positive impact
also for high income non-OECD countries which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Figure 4 reports
the associated densities. As is evident from the implied probability values, campaign contributions of both
varieties drive the probability to a high income OECD country posting most strongly not only statistically,
but in quantitative terms. The implication is that personal contributions of $650,000 and $700,000 generate
a 90% probability of appointment to a high income OECD posting for personal and bundled campaign
contributors respectively.
6.2.3 Desirability of postings: geographical location of postings
Finally we consider the association between the nature of a political appointment, and the geographical
region of appointments.
Estimation results are reported in Table 10, in which we consider the association between the political
characteristics of appointees, and the geographical region of appointment.
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE.
The fact that an appointee has political connections to the president, raises the probability that their
posting will occur in the Caribbean, North and Central America relative to that of a career diplomat from
5% to 30%. While this is the only statistically signiﬁcant association, there are positive estimated impacts
in East Asia & Paciﬁc,and Central & South Asia also. The implied probability values are reported in Figure
4. Note that the impact on Caribbean, North and Central American postings is quantitatively large.
Finally, personal and bundled campaign contributions statistically signiﬁcantly raise the probability of a
posting in Western Europe, and lower it in Central and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 4 reports
the implied densities. Again, from the probability values the implication is that the overwhelming impact of
campaign contributions is on postings to Western Europe. The implication is that personal contributions of
$550,000 and $750,000 generate a 90% probability of appointment to a West European posting for personal
and bundled campaign contributors respectively.
6.2.4 Conclusions
The results of this section thus imply that personal political connections receive more lucrative postings in
per capita GDP, tourist volume and hardship allowance terms. The are also more likely to receive postings
in the Caribbean, North and Central America.
The greater the personal or bundled campaign contributions to a presidential campaign, the more lucrative
the posting the contributor can expect in terms of per capita GDP, tourist volumes, hardship allowances,
and the more likely the posting will be in Western Europe, and the less likely it will be in Central and South
Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa.
6.3 What price the Court of St.James?
As a ﬁnal exercise, we provide a price list for a range of types of postings, implied by the ﬁndings of sections
6.1 and 6.2.
In generating the implied prices, we assume that the appointment is political (career diplomats by as-
sumption do not pay for a posting), and we consider the price in terms of both personal contributions and
bundled contributions, with the desirability of countries determined both in terms of the GDP per capita
metric, and the number of tourist visits metric. We limit the price list to countries that are the target
postings for campaign contributors - the high-income countries of the OECD located primarily in Western
Europe.
Results for the per capita GDP metric are reported in Table 11.
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE.
15The implication is that for personal contributions the price range for the desirable postings ranges from
$602,686 for Portugal, to approximately $3.1 million for Luxembourg. For personal contributors, the price
of the Court of St.James is $1.1 million.
Prices for bundled contributors are lower. Bundled contributors need pay only $341,160 for the Portuguese
posting, approximately $1.8 million for Luxembourg, while the Court of St.James costs only $640,583.
The drawback with the per capita GDP pricing, is that relatively small, relatively unglamorous but
nonetheless wealthy countries will come to be disproportionately highly priced, while not reﬂecting the true
cache of postings to politically more signiﬁcant destinations. An alternative pricing list that may therefore
be more representative, is provided by the number of tourist visits metric.
Results for the tourist metric are reported in Table 12.
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE.
In terms of the tourist metric, the most desirable posting is France and Monaco, for which personal
contributions would have to amount to approximately $6.2 million, bundled contributions to approximately
$4.4 million. A number of countries by contrast prove to be undesirable, with Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg,
and New Zealand all eﬀectively requiring a refund on the campaign contributions for both personal and
bundled contributors. The lowest positive price is for Norway, at $119,900 for personal, and $85,756 for
bundled contributors. The court of St. James, is available at approximately $2.3 million for personal
contributors, and $1.7 million for bundled contributors.
The "prices" derived for desirable ambassadorial postings in Tables 11 and 12 are those that are predicted
from our estimations. Other than statistical noise, three sets of considerations might generate a deviation of
the actual market price from that predicted by our model:
• The political appointee may possess additional attributes which the administration values, other than
pure ﬁnancial contributions.
• The posting may possess additional attributes that the potential appointee values.
• There may be measurement errors. Speciﬁcally, there may be a downward bias in reported contributions
insofar as contributors and campaigns have an incentive to minimize disclosure as far as possible; there
may also be a bias resulting from the fact that in some instances contributions were reported as being
in a range. Since coding adopted the upper limit of the range, this ensures that the bias arising from
data coding for the campaign contribution variables is at or below zero.36
Consider the deviations between the contributions predicted by our model (either personal or bundled),
and the contribution actually paid, as reported in Figure 5.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE.
On the per capita GDP metric, positive deviations indicate that the appointees paid less than the model
predicts; negative deviations that they paid more than the model predicts. In accounting for possible reasons
for the deviations, we note that for Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and Argentina, the appointees had
political connections with either the President, a senior member of the Administration, or the Democratic
Party. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Mexico, the appointee brought independent think tank expertise to
the post, in addition to having provided campaign ﬁnances. Thus for both sets of appointees, they possessed
attributes that eﬀectively allowed them to bargain down the campaign contributions they provided to the
Obama presidential campaign.
On the other hand, in the case of Hungary, Romania, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador
and Germany, in all instances the appointees had long-standing political connections, but they also paid
more for the appointments than the model would have suggested. The implication is that in these cases,
additional attributes of the postings were such that they allowed for the extraction of a higher price in
campaign contributions. However, when we repeat the exercise for personal campaign contributions, but
on the tourism metric, note that the implication is in fact that appointees to Hungary, Romania and the
Dominican Republic underpaid. Only for Germany, Costa Rica and El Salvador is the suggestion still that
the appointee overpaid.
Across both sets of desirability attributes of postings, per capita GDP and attractiveness as a tourist
destination, we can readily account for the magnitude of campaign contributions, with the sole exceptions
36Though for the top contributor category we have data only on the lower limit.
16of Germany, Costa Rica and El Salvador, where the campaign contributors appear to have paid more than
necessary across both characteristics.
For bundled campaign contributions, for the GDP per capita and tourism metrics respectively, we can
readily account for Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Australia, the Slovak Republic, Japan, Switzerland &
Liechtenstein, Finland and Sweden, since though the modelling suggests that appointees underpaid in terms
of the GDP per capita metric, once we account for the attractiveness of these postings as tourist destinations,
the indication is in fact that the appointees overpaid. The inference is that these countries, while rich and
therefore attractive postings, are less attractive in terms of their ability to draw tourists, accounting for their
inability to draw a higher market price.
The reverse is true for France and Monacco, Portugal, Spain and Morocco. Here, on the GDP per capita
metric the indication is that appointees paid too much - yet the strength of these postings in terms of their
attractiveness as a tourist destination, implies that the appointees may in fact have paid too little. Thus the
inference is that the weakness of the postings in terms of the standard of living aﬀo r d e di nG D Pt e r m s ,i s
compensated for by their attractiveness as tourist destinations.
In the case of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Belize, Trinidad & Tobago, the Bahamas and South Africa,
appointees overpaid on both the per capita GDP and the tourist metrics, again suggesting that for these
appointees the postings have desirable attributes not fully reﬂected in their standard of living measure, or
their attractiveness as a tourist destination.
On the other hand, two puzzles under the bundled campaign contributions arise in the case of the United
Kingdom and Austria, for which our analysis suggests that the appointees underpaid for the post they
received, on both the GDP and the tourist metric. What is more, there is no recorded political connection
to members of the administration, nor do they bring special think tank-like expertise to bear on the posting.
7 Conclusions and Evaluation
We have explored the distribution of career diplomats and political appointments to diplomatic posts across
a range of characteristics of postings, that serve to indicate the attractiveness of the posting.
The results of the paper indicate that political appointees are more likely to obtain posts in high-income
OECD countries, that are strong tourist destinations, are located in Western Europe, and that carry lower
hardship allowances, than are career diplomats. We have also shown that the greater the personal or bundled
campaign contributions to a presidential campaign, the more lucrative the posting the contributor can expect
in terms of per capita GDP, tourist volumes, hardship allowances, and the more likely the posting will be in
Western Europe, and the less likely it will be in Central and South Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, we have established that the price range for the Court of St. James lies between $650,000 and
$2.3 million.
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Table 1: Composition of Diplomatic Appointments 
YEAR  Total Missions  Ambassadors  Career  Political % Career  Other COM  Career  Political % Career
1915  42  12  2  10  17  30  1  29  29 
1920  44  10  1  9  10  34  14  20  20 
1925  50  13  3  10  23  37  18  19  19 
1930  55  16  4  8  33  39  22  17  17 
1935  56  17  7  10  41  39  21  18  18 
1940  51  20  11  9  55  31  18  13  13 
1945  53  35  21  14  60  18  13  5  5 




ADMINISTRATION  TOTAL Career(%)  Political(%)
Eisenhower  214  146 (68%)  68 (32%) 
Kennedy  120  73 (61%)  47 (39%) 
Johnson  148  89 (60%)  59 (40%) 
Nixon  233  159 (68%)  74 (32%) 
Ford  96  65 (68%)  31 (32%) 
Carter  193  138 (72%)  55 (28%) 
Reagan  356  238 (67%)  118 (33%) 
Bush I  272  187 (69%)  85 (31%) 
Clinton  401  297 (74%)  104 (26%) 
Bush II  424  307 (72%)  117 (28%) 







REGION  #Career #Political % Political Since 1960
Caribbean  41  111  73.0 
Western Europe  101  259  71.9 
Oceania  75  71  48.6 
North & Cen. America  83  61  42.4 
South Asia  81  31  27.7 
East Asia  143  47  24.7 
Eastern Europe  144  41  22.2 
South America  160  45  22.0 
Africa  613  108  15.0 
The Middle East  222  36  14.0 
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High Income Non‐OECD         0.370679 
(0.6399) 
  
TOURISM             6.72761e‐008*
(3.866e‐008) 
HARDSHIP             ‐ 0.0803617** 
(0.04056) 
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Adj‐R^2 0.292033 0.132334 0.273517 ‐ 0.00555038



















































































































































































Country  GDPPC  Personal Contribution  Bundler Contribution
Australia  39692.06 1337177  756930 
Austria  39454.01 1326631  750959 
Belgium  36274.55 1185766  671221 
Canada  39033.69 1308009  740418 
Denmark  36763.96 1207449  683495 
Finland  34092.26 1089080  616490 
France and Monaco  34092.26 1089080  616490 
Germany  35930.37 1170517  662589 
Greece  28833.71 856102  484609 
Iceland  36681.36 1203790  681423 
Ireland  38816.48 1298385  734970 
Italy and San Marino  29417.92 881985  499261 
Japan  33828.07 1077375  609865 
Luxembourg  80304.35 3136490  1775458 
Netherlands  40777.34 1385260  784148 
New Zealand and Samoa  27420  793468  449155 
Norway  52238.75 1893054  1071592 
Portugal  23113.86 602686  341160 
South Korea  29790.89 898510  508615 
Spain and Andorra  29651.7  892343  505124 
Sweden  37775.4  1252260  708861 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein  41765.28 1429030  808924 




Country  Tourism  Personal Contribution  Bundler Contribution
Australia  5,496,988  257941  184487 
Austria  14,541,922 1020204  729678 
Belgium  5,409,064  250532  179187 
Canada  18,770,444 1376563  984555 
Denmark  2,230,351 ‐ 17355 ‐ 12413 
Finland  5,038,000  219260  156821 
France and Monaco  76,001,000 6199675  4434174 
Germany  19,171,249 1410341  1008714 
Greece  14,276,465 997833  713677 
Iceland  643,376 ‐ 151097 ‐ 108069 
Ireland  7,334,000  412756  295214 
Italy and San Marino  36,512,500 2871777  2053972 
Japan  6,727,926  361679  258682 
Luxembourg  666,783 ‐ 149125 ‐ 106658 
Netherlands  8,080,600  475676  340216 
New Zealand and Samoa  2,365,529 ‐ 5963 ‐ 4265 
Norway  3,859,000  119900  85756 
Portugal  11,616,899 773698  553369 
South Korea  6,022,752  302250  216178 
Spain and Andorra  55,913,780 4506822  3223400 
Sweden  7,627,000  437448  312875 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein 7,228,851  403894  288876 
United Kingdom  29,970,000 2320407  1659618 
  
Table A1: Countries Included in Sample 
Afghanistan  Czech Republic  Laos  Portugal 
Albania  Denmark  Latvia  Qatar 
Algeria  Djibouti  Lebanon  Romania 
Angola  Dominican Republic  Lesotho  Russia 
Argentina  Ecuador  Liberia  Rwanda 
Armenia  Egypt  Libya  Saudi Arabia 
Australia  El Salvador  Lithuania  Senegal and Guinea Bissau 
Austria  Equatorial Guinea  Luxembourg  Serbia 
Azerbaijan  Eritrea   Macedonia  Sierra Leone 
Bahamas  Estonia  Madagascar and Comoros  Singapore 
Bahrain  Ethiopia  Malawi  Slovak Republic 
Bangladesh  Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu  Malaysia  Slovenia 
Barbados  Finland  Mali  South Africa 
Belarus  France and Monaco  Malta  South Korea 
Belgium  Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe  Marshall Islands  Spain and Andorra 
Belize  The Gambia  Mauritania  Sri Lanka and Maldives 
Benin  Georgia  Mauritius and Seychelles  Sudan 
Bolivia  Germany  Mexico  Suriname 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Ghana  Micronesia  Swaziland 
Botswana  Greece  Moldova  Sweden 
Brazil  Guatemala  Mongolia  Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
Brunei Darussalam  Guinea  Montenegro  Syria 
Bulgaria  Guyana  Morocco  Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso  Haiti  Mozambique  Tanzania 
Burma  Honduras  Namibia  Thailand 
Burundi  Hungary  Nepal  Timor‐Leste 
Cambodia  Iceland  Netherlands  Togo 
Cameroon  India  New Zealand and Samoa  Trinidad & Tobago 
Canada  Indonesia  Nicaragua  Tunisia 
Cape Verde  Iraq  Niger  Turkey 
Central African Republic  Ireland  Nigeria  Turkmenistan 
Chad  Israel  Norway  Uganda 
Chile  Italy and San Marino  Oman  Ukraine 
China  Jamaica  Pakistan  United Arab Emirates 
Colombia  Japan  Palau  United Kingdom 
Congo (DR)  Jordan  Panama  Uruguay 
Congo (Republic of)  Kazakhstan  Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu  Uzbekistan 
Costa Rica  Kenya (and Somalia)  Paraguay  Venezuela 
Cote d'Ivoire  Kosovo  Peru  Vietnam 
Croatia  Kuwait  Philippines  Yemen 
Cyprus  Kyrgyz Republic  Poland  Zambia 




  OBAMA POL. APP. As of  January  2011
COUNTRY  AMBASSADOR Political Donor‐allBUND. Notes – dates of contr. 
Afghanistan  Karl Eikenberry Retired General





Belize  Vinai Thummalapally College 100,000 Roommates
Botswana  Michelle Gavin – Nom. NSC, CFR fellow
Canada  David Jacobson Chicago 50‐100K WH personnel
China  Jon Huntsman  Republican Resigned 4/11
Costa Rica  Anne Slaughter Andrew 88,000 Husband former DNC chair 
Czech Republic  Norman L. Eisen College 58,250 200‐500KWH ethics lawyer 
Denmark  Laurie Susan Fulton 49,000 100‐200KSince 89
Dominican Rep.  Raul Yzaguirre, Sr. HA  1,000 Activist
El Salvador  Mari Carmen Aponte HA 17,950 Recess appt.
Finland  Bruce Oreck  575,000
France & Monaco Charles Rivkin  800,000
Germany  Philip D. Murphy 1.5 mill. Since 89, 100k inaug. 
Holy See  Miguel Humberto Diaz HA Cath.
Hungary  Eleni Kounalakis 439,000 Since 89
India  Timothy Roemer Cong. Former Congressman 
Ireland  Daniel Rooney  152,000 Since 89, Steelers 
Italy   David Thorne   29,000 Since 89, Kerry link 
Japan  John V. Roos  500,000
Luxembourg  Cynthia Stroum 800,000 Resigned Jan 2011 
Malta  Douglas Kmiec  Catholic Denied communion  
Mexico  Carlos Pascual     1,000 CFR, Brookings
Morocco  Samuel Kaplan 78,590 200,000
Netherlands  Fay Hartog‐Levin Chicago 500,000 Cousin of Carl
New Zealand  David Huebner Openly gay
Norway  Barry B. White  100,000 200,000
Poland  Lee Feinstein   2,300 Hillary Clinton link, Brookings 
Portugal  Allan J. Katz  500,000 CFR
Romania  Mark Gitenstein 128,600 Since 89, Brookings 
Saudi Arabia  James B. Smith    3,300   Retired General
Singapore  David Adelman GA politician
Slovak Republic  Theodore Sedgwick 52,416 200,000
South Africa  Donald Gips  Friend 500,000 WH personnel chief 
Spain   Alan Solomont 500,000
Sweden  Matthew Barzun 687,500
Switz. &Liecht.  Don Beyer  399,000 745,000 Since 89, VA Lt. Gov. 
Tanzania  Alfonso Lenhardt AA Retired General
Trinidad & Tobag. Beatrice W. Welters AA 500,000


























































Country  Rate Country  Rate
AFGHANISTAN 35% LIBERIA 30%
ALBANIA  20% LIBYA 20%
ALGERIA  20% LITHUANIA 5%
ANGOLA  25% MACEDONIA 15%
ARMENIA 20% MADAGASCAR 25%
AZERBAIJAN 20% MALAWI 25%
BAHRAIN 10% MALAYSIA 10%
BANGLADESH 30% MALI 25%
BELARUS  25% MALTA 5%
BELIZE  20% MARSHALL IS. 20%
BENIN  20% MAURITANIA 25%
BOLIVIA  25% MAURITIUS 5%
BOSNIA‐HERZ. 20% MEXICO 15%
BOTSWANA 10% MICRONESIA 20%
BRAZIL  10% MOLDOVA 20%
BRUNEI  15% MONGOLIA 25%
BULGARIA 10% MONTENEGRO 15%
BURKINA FASO 20% MOZAMBIQUE 25%
BURMA  30% NAMIBIA 5%
BURUNDI 25% NEPAL 25%
CAMBODIA 25% NICARAGUA 15%
CAMEROON 25% NIGER 25%
CAPE VERDE 25% NIGERIA 25%
CEN. AFR. REP. 30% PAKISTAN 25%
CHAD  30% PALAU 10%
CHINA  15% PAPUA NEW GU. 30%
COLOMBIA 5% PARAGUAY 5%
COTE D'IVOIRE 20% PERU 15%
CUBA  30% PHILIPPINES 20%
DEM. REP. CONGO 30% QATAR 5%
DJIBOUTI 30% REP. OF CONGO 30%
DOM. REPUBLIC 15% ROMANIA 5%
ECUADOR 10% RUSSIA 15%
EGYPT  25% RWANDA 25%
EL SALVADOR 15% SAUDI ARABIA 20%
EQU. GUINEA 35% SENEGAL 15%
ERITREA  30% SERBIA 15%
ESTONIA  10% SIERRA LEONE 30%
ETHIOPIA 25% SLOVAK REP. 10%
FIJI  20% SOUTH AFRICA 10%
GABON  15% SRI LANKA 20%
GEORGIA 25% SUDAN 25%
GHANA  20% SURINAME 25%
GREECE  5% SWAZILAND 15%
GUATEMALA 15% SYRIA 20%
GUINEA  30% TAJIKISTAN 35%
GUYANA  25% TANZANIA 25%
HAITI  30% THAILAND 10%
HONDURAS 15% THE GAMBIA 20%
ICELAND  10% TIMOR LESTE 35%
INDIA  20% TOGO 25%
INDONESIA 25% TRIN. & TOBAGO 5%
IRAQ  35% TUNISIA 10%
JAMAICA  15% TURKEY 10%
JORDAN  5% TURKMENISTAN 25%
KAZAKHSTAN 25% UGANDA 25%
KENYA  30% UKRAINE 20%
KOSOVO  20% UZBEKISTAN 30%
KUWAIT  10% VENEZUELA 20%
KYRGYZSTAN 25% VIETNAM 25%
LAOS  30% YEMEN 20%
LATVIA  10% ZAMBIA 20%








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Low Income Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income High Income OECD High Income non‐OECD
Career Political Connection
East Asia & Pacific 0.15 0.25
Eastern Europe 0.15 0.10
Western Europe 0.03 0.03
Caribbean, North & Central America 0.05 0.30
South America 0.09 0.08
Central & South Asia 0.11 0.25
MENA 0.14 0.11
Sub‐Saharan Africa 0.32 0.29
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